Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has made threats against undersea internet cables, particularly those in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
Note: While these threats are widely reported, some analysis suggests that social media amplification has driven some of the panic surrounding these reports, rather than confirmed, official governmental statements from all parties involved.
“Their line is gone out through all the earth, & their words to the end of the world.” — Psalm 19:4
“The sea is His, for He made it & His hands formed the dry land.” — Psalm 95:5
The Strait of Hormuz is not just an oil chokepoint — it is also a major route for undersea fiber-optic internet cables connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. These submarine cables carry huge amounts of global internet traffic, financial transactions, cloud data, phone calls, and military communications.
Major cable systems in or near the Strait include:
- AAE-1
- FALCON
- SEA-ME-WE
- TGN-Gulf
- Gulf Bridge International
Recent attention on this has increased because Iranian media linked to the IRGC publicly highlighted these cables and discussed how strategically important — and vulnerable — they are.
If multiple cables in the Strait of Hormuz were damaged:
- Internet speeds between Europe, the Gulf, and Asia could slow
- Financial markets and cloud services could be disrupted
- Some countries in the Gulf region could experience outages
- Traffic would reroute through other cables, but congestion could occur
However, the global internet has redundancy built in, so a total worldwide internet collapse is unlikely unless many cable systems in several regions were hit simultaneously.
It would probably be easier to damage some of these cables than most people realize, especially in shallow waters near chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Undersea internet cables are physically armored fiber-optic lines lying on or buried slightly beneath the seabed. They are not surrounded by giant concrete tunnels or heavily guarded 24/7.
That said, “easy to cut” does not automatically mean “easy to cripple the internet.”
A few important realities:
- Most cable breaks worldwide are accidental, usually caused by ship anchors or fishing gear. Experts estimate roughly 70–80% of faults come from those causes
- A determined state actor or group with boats, divers, underwater drones, mines, or submersible capability could potentially damage cables in shallow regions
- Deep-water cables are much harder to reach because they may lie hundreds or thousands of meters underwater
- The real vulnerability in Hormuz is geographic concentration — many cables pass through a narrow corridor
However:
- The internet was designed with rerouting and redundancy
- One or two cuts would likely slow traffic and disrupt Gulf-region connectivity more than destroy the global internet
- Simultaneous attacks on multiple cables plus ongoing conflict preventing repairs would be far more serious
Repair is another issue:
- Specialized cable-repair ships are needed
- In an active war zone, repairs can be delayed for weeks or months because of mines, military danger, or permit restrictions
So in plain English:
- Damaging a cable: potentially not very difficult in some areas
- Causing a major long-term regional disruption: harder, but possible
- Shutting down the world internet: very unlikely
The shallowest submarine internet cables are extremely shallow near coastlines and landing stations.
Here is the realistic range:
- Absolute shallowest sections (shore approaches or beach landings): often 0 to 10 meters (0 to 33 ft) of water depth. In some cases, cables are pulled directly onto the beach and then transition underground almost immediately
- Nearshore coastal zones: typically 10 to 50 meters (33 to 164 ft) deep
- After leaving coastal waters: they quickly drop to hundreds or thousands of meters in the open ocean
For the Strait of Hormuz specifically:
- Much of it is relatively shallow compared to open oceans
- Large portions are roughly 20 to 60 meters (65 to 200 ft) deep, with some deeper channels
Important detail: the cable is often not just exposed on the seabed. In shallow areas it is usually:
- buried 1 to 3 meters under the seabed
- or covered with rock or armored protection
So even in shallow water, it is partially protected, though still more accessible than deep ocean segments.
In short: the most vulnerable parts are usually the first few kilometers from shore, in water shallow enough for anchoring, diving, or coastal activity, not the deep ocean.
But even the IRGC needs to
be concerned about world reaction
You’re pointing at a real constraint in this kind of scenario: even bad actors with strong regional goals have to weigh global consequences, especially when infrastructure is shared internationally.
Strategically, the Strait of Hormuz is not a “local” system—it’s part of the global backbone. So anything that significantly disrupts undersea cables there wouldn’t just affect nearby countries; it would likely spill into:
European–Asia internet routing (cloud services, banking, trade systems)
Gulf states’ connectivity (which rely heavily on a small number of landing points). Global financial latency and data redundancy systems
That creates what strategists often call a “second-order restraint”: even if a disruption is physically possible, the political and economic backlash can be disproportionate.
For Iran specifically (including IRGC-linked decision-making structures), there are a few balancing pressures often discussed in open-source analysis:
Escalation risk: damaging shared infrastructure can widen a conflict from regional to international involvement very quickly
Economic feedback: Iran itself benefits from regional connectivity and would not be fully insulated from disruption
Strategic signaling: actions that affect global systems tend to trigger stronger coalition responses than localized military actions
The following is a strategic assessment of why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) faces prohibitive risks should they choose to sever undersea fiber-optic cables in the Strait of Hormuz
The Illusion of a "Local" Strike
The IRGC often views the Strait of Hormuz as its own "backyard," but when it comes to submarine cables like AAE-1** or SEA-ME-WE, the geography is deceptive.
These are not Iranian assets; they are the nervous system of the global economy. Cutting these lines transcends a regional dispute and enters the realm of a direct assault on the national security of dozens of nations simultaneously, from European financial hubs to Asian manufacturing giants.
The "Red Line" and Global Coalition
While the IRGC has long operated in the "Grey Zone"—using deniable tactics to harass shipping—the sabotage of global internet infrastructure is a bright "Red Line".
Such an act would likely trigger the "Escalation Alert" mentioned in strategic circles, transitioning the international community from diplomatic condemnation to a coordinated military response.
Unlike localized skirmishes, cable sabotage invites a unified Coalition Defensive Posture involving targeted strikes and crippling sanctions that could isolate Iran more than ever before
.
Economic Self-Harm
The IRGC must consider the "Economic Feedback Loop". Iran is not insulated from the digital world. Disruption to regional routing often causes data "backflow," potentially crippling Iran’s own domestic banking, internal communications, and trade.
In an attempt to blind the West, the IRGC risks plunging its own nation into a digital dark age, fueling internal unrest and economic collapse.
The Plausibility Gap
While 70–80% of cable faults are accidental, a simultaneous break of multiple armored systems in a contested corridor like Hormuz would be immediately recognized as a Deliberate Act.
International multi-domain intelligence can track submersible and diver activity with high precision. There is no "deniability" for a coordinated attack on the global backbone.
Conclusion: A Strategic Dead End
In short, the IRGC should be deeply concerned because the world’s reaction would be disproportionate to the tactical gain.
The global internet was designed for redundancy, meaning a total shutdown is unlikely, but the political and military backlash against the perpetrator would be absolute. Sabotaging the cables doesn't just cut a wire; it cuts Iran off from the global community, turning a regional power into a global pariah with a target on its back.
